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Responding to Gabriel Mendlow, Why Is it Wrong To Punish Thought?, 127 




Gabriel Mendlow has published a rich and provocative essay on thought 
crimes.1  In it, he argues that punishing thoughts is wrong, in essence, because mind 
control is wrong.  According to Professor Mendlow, (1) we enjoy a right of “mental 
integrity” that forbids the state from controlling our thoughts, and (2) authority to 
control is a prerequisite of authority to punish; if the state may not directly control 
an activity on the basis of its wrongness (in this case, thinking), the state is likewise 
forbidden from imposing criminal sanctions on the same activity after the fact.2 
The second proposition, which Professor Mendlow calls the “Enforceability 
Constraint,” forms the heart of his argument and represents an interesting conceptual 
innovation.3  But it is also, we will see, an implausible account of criminal law.  
Though the Enforceability Constraint gives voice to a common sensibility about 
police power—that authority to enforce a criminal prohibition follows automatically 
from the state’s authority to criminalize an activity in the first place—it is this 
sensibility itself, not our view of thought crimes, that needs reforming. 
The problem runs deep.  Despite the novelty of the Enforceability Constraint as 
a theoretical construct, Professor Mendlow’s substantive position is quite 
conventional.  Our criminal-legal institutions (including courts) customarily assume 
a link, in keeping with Professor Mendlow’s theory, between prohibition and 
enforcement.  In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that all of American 
criminal procedure begins from the premise that if activity x has been legitimately 
proscribed, enforcement officials who happen upon the occurrence of activity x in 
the world are authorized—by virtue of its proscription—to forcibly bring about the 
activity’s end. 
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2   Id. at 2370.  
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This, I will argue, is a philosophical mistake, and one with serious practical 
consequences.  Part of why policing is so deplorable today—certainly not the only 
reason, but an important part of the story—is the political theory that underpins it.  
Professor Mendlow’s Enforceability Constraint is an effort to name and flesh out 
that theory.  To the extent it also endeavors to apologize for the theory on normative 
grounds, it must be rejected. 
Ultimately, Professor Mendlow has the core point backwards.  According to 
him, the state may not punish at t2 an activity that officials do not even have authority 
to control at t1.  The correct theory of criminal law, however, hews the other way: 
officials may not control at t1 an activity the state does not even have authority to 
punish at t2.  In other words, punishability sets an outer limit on control.  The reason 
is simple.  A legal order that authorized officials to exert direct, physical control 
over activities beyond those designatable for criminal punishment would be a police 
state, one in which individual law enforcement officers, rather than legislative 
bodies—and ultimately, the people—set the bounds of state power. 
Professor Mendlow seeks to make the mirror-image claim: that direct 
controllability sets an outer limit on punishment.  But there is nothing infirm about 
a legal order in which officials are not authorized to control every activity 
legitimately subject to criminal sanction.  In fact, this is likely the mark of a healthy 
legal order.  As much as the two forms of authority—punishment and policing—are 
bound to coincide in practice, we should insist on their separation in principle.  And 
we should likewise insist that authority to control requires, but is not entailed by, 
authority to punish—not the other way around. 
Before jumping in, I want to praise Professor Mendlow for making my job easy 
and enjoyable.  His prose sings; his logic never obfuscates.  The entire essay, in fact, 
sparkles with the kind of analytic delight promised by the Socratic tradition but too 




Let us begin with a point of—significant—agreement: the poverty of existing 
accounts of what makes thought crimes verboten.  Those accounts, Professor 
Mendlow shows, come back to some combination of the following: (1) that thought 
crimes would be terribly hard to enforce;4 (2) that thoughts, even at their worst, are 
relatively harmless (by comparison to actions);5 or (3) that even if thoughts are 
harmful, they are not viable candidates for legal culpability.6 
Yet on closer inspection, none of these rationales—alone or in tandem—can 
shoulder the burden required of them.  The first, Professor Mendlow demonstrates, 
 
4   See id. at 2346–47 (outlining the general form of this argument); id. at 2354–58 (exploring a 
specific version of the argument, focused on the difficulty of proving thought crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt).  
5   See id. at 2347–50.  
6   See id. at 2350–54.  
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is no argument at all; many crimes end up, in practice, being notoriously hard to 
enforce, but this has never been thought to preclude criminalization.7  To be sure, 
enforcement woes may count as a pragmatic reason not to criminalize thoughts (or 
any other class of activity), but they hardly mount an argument against 
criminalization in principle.8 
The second rationale, meanwhile, rests on an implausible theory of the 
relationship between thoughts and actions.  As Professor Mendlow rightly argues, 
at least some thoughts—namely, those involving an intention toward action—can be 
harmful in the same way as reckless conduct: by creating a danger of future injury.9  
Imagine Mary thinks, “I intend to kill Dan.”  Assuming Mary is a “competent person 
with the means to kill, the danger posed by [her] lethal intention”—the increased 
risk of injury it conduces—“could be at least as great as that posed by many risky 
activities we seldom think twice about punishing, such as driving recklessly and 
possessing volatile explosives.”10 
Finally, the third rationale proves to be little more than ipse dixit.  If, per the 
analysis just offered, thoughts can be harmful (at least to the same extent as 
criminally-reckless behavior), why would they be exempt, nonetheless, from legal 
culpability?  The typical answer is that actions, unlike thoughts, “unleash” effects,11 
or, put otherwise, that they “touch[] and make[] an impress on the outside world.”12  
Yet—to quote Professor Mendlow’s sharp formulation—an “explanation” of this 
form actually “explains nothing.”13  It restates the “difference between actions and 
mere mental states,” almost in the manner of a dictionary, but it provides “no account 
of why the difference matters.”14 
No disagreement so far: in fact, I find Professor Mendlow’s dissection of 
existing rationales for the prohibition on thought crimes elegant and persuasive.  My 
concern relates to the essay’s second part, where Professor Mendlow aims to solve 
 
7   See id. at 2356–57.   
8   See id. at 2358 (“These risks [related to enforcement] surely give us some reason not to 
punish thought. Indeed, they give us some reason to treat punishment for thought as though it were 
morally forbidden. But they don’t establish that punishment for thought is morally forbidden in fact.”). 
9   See id. at 2348–49 (“[Other commentators are] simply wrong to assume that unexecuted 
intentions risk only a ‘small degree of harm.’ Consider a person’s intention to kill, particularly when 
formed after extensive reflection and deliberation. Is such an intention really less likely to cause harm 
than driving recklessly or possessing volatile explosives—activities that we don’t hesitate to 
criminalize on account of their dangerousness? If no lethal intention were more than minimally 
dangerous, it would be irrational for me to fear you simply because you intended to kill me. But it’s 
difficult to accept that such fear is irrational. There would be little point to forming intentions if 
intentions didn’t generally increase the likelihood of actions.”) (internal citations omitted).   
10  Id. at 2350.  
11  See id. at 2351 n.17 (compiling sources to this effect).   
12  Id. at 2353. For the canonical statement of this view, see Francis Wharton, Comparative 
Criminal Jurisprudence, 4 CRIM. L. MAG. 1 (1883).  
13  Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2354. 
14  Id.  
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his own puzzle by casting “the ban on thought crime as a categorical moral 
immunity.”15 
Here, the idea is that we can appreciate the infirmity of thought crimes by 
exploring what makes its conceptual sibling, thought control, wrong.  Professor 
Mendlow believes the two intolerable for the same reason: punishing thought and 
controlling thought both violate one’s right to “mental integrity.”16  More 
specifically, Professor Mendlow thinks the violation occasioned by punishing 
thought follows a fortiori from the violation occasioned by direct interference with 
thought, because—and herein lies the fulcrum of his argument—authority to control 
is a necessary condition of authority to punish. 
Professor Mendlow deems this latter principle the Enforceability Constraint, 
and he articulates it numerous ways.  For example: “the state may ensure compliance 
with a given norm through criminal punishment only when the state may in principle 
force compliance with that norm directly.”17  Or likewise: “[t]he state may punish 
someone for transgressions of a given type only when the state may in principle use 
reasonable force to thwart such transgressions merely on the ground that they’re 
criminally wrongful.”18  Whatever the exact language used, the conceptual upshot is 
that if the state is empowered to punish activity x, then the state is empowered to 
control activity x.  With this syllogism in tow, Professor Mendlow’s strategy is to 
focus on the contrapositive: to disprove the “then” statement—to establish that the 
state may not control our thoughts—from which the falseness of the “if” statement 
would follow. 
In short, Professor Mendlow believes we can rationalize the wrongness of 
thought crimes by (1) shoring up the intuition that state-sponsored thought control 
is wrong, and (2) establishing that if the state may not directly control an activity, 
neither, by logical implication, may it punish the same activity later on.  It is the 




Suppose, in a given jurisdiction, it is a crime to voluntarily come under the 
influence of substance x; if a person is found to be or have been so influenced, they 
may be criminally punished.  And suppose, further, that police come across Jones 
(in a public park, say), whom they have very good reason to believe has recently 
ingested a large amount of substance x.  May the police forcibly pump Jones’s 
stomach, or strap Jones down and inject a counteractive drug, to “force compliance 
 
15  Id. at 2359.  
16   Id. at 2342. 
17  Id. at 2346.  
18  Id. at 2371.  
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with [the law] directly”?19  Of course not—doctrinally, because of Rochin v. 
California,20 though more importantly, because doing so would be abominable.21 
By itself, of course, this does not necessarily show that forced compliance with 
the substance x law is wrong in principle; it may simply show that stomach pumping 
and compulsory injection are impermissible means of forcing compliance.  That is 
surely what Professor Mendlow would say.  In fact, his analysis leans heavily on the 
distinction between wrongness in principle and wrongness in practice—even going 
so far as to suggest that where, practically speaking, there are no permissible means 
of forcing compliance with a given law, it can still be permissible to do so in 
principle.  In his words: 
 
[C]ircumstances sometimes arise where the amount of force necessary and 
sufficient to stop a given transgression is unreasonably great.  Suppose a 
narcochemist is manufacturing methamphetamine in a treehouse and the 
only way the police can stop him is by cutting the tree down, paralyzing 
him in the process.  May the police cut down the tree?  Clearly not, and 
the Enforceability Constraint agrees.  What the state may punish, the state 
in principle may impede—but only with reasonable force.  Unreasonable 
force wrongs the narcochemist. . . . [Even] [i]n a world where no single 
instance of a given offense is disruptable through reasonable force—a 
world where every narcochemist operates from a fortified treehouse—the 
Enforceability Constraint still permits offenders to be punished.  The 
Enforceability Constraint says that an offense is unpunishable if it’s 
always wrong in principle to disrupt instances of that offense merely on 
grounds of wrongfulness.  In a world of fortified treehouse meth labs, it’s 
always wrong to disrupt meth-making in practice, but it isn’t always (or 
perhaps ever) wrong to do so in principle.22  
 
I grant Professor Mendlow the treebound-narcochemist case.  The question is 
whether the same logic applies to Jones the drug user.  And the answer depends on 
whether we can imagine means of interfering with Jones’s activity—reversing his 
metabolism of the drug, or forcibly ejecting it from his system—that would be 
consistent with basic principles of individual dignity and bodily autonomy.  After 
all, it is easy to see why shutting down a treehouse meth lab is permissible in 
principle; one need only imagine a technological innovation (e.g., a means of aerial 
intervention, or a mechanism for causing trees to fall much more slowly to the 
ground) that would solve the collateral damage problem.  The issue in the 
 
19  Id. at 2346. 
20  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
21  The Rochin Court—confronting a situation in which law enforcement officials forcibly 
pumped a suspect’s stomach to recover evidence—rightly invoked the idea of a “shock to [the] 
conscience.”  Id. at 172.  
22  Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2374. 
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narcochemist case, in other words, is that stopping this particular instance of meth-
making is likely, given its location, to cause severe incidental harm—but there is 
nothing infirm, in the abstract, about thwarting meth production.  That is Professor 
Mendlow’s point. 
Is the same true of Jones’s case?  I think not.  There, the issue is not that 
thwarting the criminal act—undoing the influence of drugs in Jones’s system—runs 
too great a risk of incidental harm.  Rather, undoing the influence of drugs in Jones’s 
system is the harm, for it is a direct violation of his bodily integrity.  This is not to 
say, of course, that Jones may not be arrested (or punished) for ingesting substance 
x.  He may be.  Likewise, if there are reasons apart from criminal wrongness to 
interfere with Jones’s bodily integrity—quarantining him, say, or possibly even 
pumping his stomach, if the ingestion of substance x poses overwhelming public 
safety concerns—that, in theory, could be justified.  What matters for Professor 
Mendlow’s account, however, is whether “the state may in principle use reasonable 
force to thwart [a] transgression[] merely [because it is] criminally wrongful.”23  
Which is just what seems forbidden here. 
The “substance x” case is no mere hypothetical.  Many jurisdictions have public 
intoxication laws, some of which criminalize the act of being under the influence of 
alcohol or other drugs unto itself (by contrast to intoxication laws that include an 
additional element along the lines of disorderliness).24  What is more, public 
intoxication laws have been explicitly upheld against constitutional challenge,25 and 
there is no reason, in principle, that a state would be forbidden from criminalizing 
intoxication across the board, in private as well as in public.26  (I am not saying this 
would be sound policy, obviously; only that it would not disrespect any fundamental 
limits on the state’s authority to punish.)  But even so, state officials would still lack 




Of course, even if the Enforceability Constraint falls short as a logical truism—
in light of laws prohibiting things like intoxication, which qualify (in principle) for 
punishment but not direct control—it could still be a valid sociological observation.  
Professor Mendlow may be right, in other words, that our criminal-legal institutions 
tend to abide by the Enforceability Constraint, even if they do not do so in 100% of 
 
23  Id. at 2371 (emphasis added). 
24  See, e.g., Code of Iowa § 123.46(2) (“A person shall not be intoxicated in a public place”); 
Texas Penal Code § 49.02(a) (“A person commits an offense [under this section] if the person appears 
in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another.”). 
25  See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
26  See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550 (making it a crime to be under the influence of 
a controlled substance, unless administered by a doctor—carrying a penalty of up to one year in county 
jail). 
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cases.  In fact, I think he is right; the Enforceability Constraint offers a crisp, 
philosophically-honed description of existing practice. 
The crux of the matter, then, is normative.  Professor Mendlow’s goal—and 
mine, too—is to craft a political theory of criminal law that explains and legitimates 
the state’s often-violent, more-than-occasionally deadly, exercise of enforcement 
power; if not in all times and places, at least in contemporary liberal-democratic 
legal regimes.  “In our system of criminal administration,” Professor Mendlow 
writes, 
 
the state may ensure compliance with penal norms not only indirectly 
through punishment, but also through direct compulsive force.  When 
you’re selling loose cigarettes, the police may take them from your hand.  
When you’re making a bomb, the police may escort you from your 
laboratory.  When you’re absconding with stolen goods, the police may 
stop you and seize them.27 
 
The “may” language here is telling; there is more at stake than pattern-recognition.  
The goal is to theorize the legitimate exercise of state power—not just to observe 
how, rightly or wrongly, it tends to get exercised in practice. 
What is more, the normative claim has a rich pedigree.  Although Professor 
Mendlow may be the first scholar to have endowed it with a name, the idea that 
authority to punish entails authority to control has long been a feature of our criminal 
justice system.  The Enforceability Constraint is the contrapositive statement of this 
idea.  But either way—formulated as P  Q or ¬Q  ¬P, where P denotes authority 
to punish, and Q, authority to control—the upshot is the same.  So long as an activity 
has been (legitimately) subject to criminal punishment, the police enjoy 
corresponding enforcement authority.  If they happen on the activity in the world, 
they may, in principle, thwart it; and they may also, in principle, place the relevant 
actor under arrest, kicking into gear the full machinery of criminal punishment. 
Put slightly differently, the mere existence of a criminal statute—assuming the 
statute was duly enacted, that it does not run afoul of any substantive limits on state 
power (e.g., the prohibition on ex post facto lawmaking), and that its enforcement 
adheres to the demands of due process and equal protection—is typically understood 
to confer the police authority to enforce the statute’s terms.  And what is more, it is 
understood to confer police authority to use significant force to enforce the statute’s 
terms.  This does not make all enforcement measures fair game, of course.  Limits 
remain; officials must be reasonable when deciding how much, and what kind of, 
force to use.  But the threshold grant of authority flows seamlessly—almost 
inexorably—from the fact of the underlying law.28 
 
27  Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2370. 
28  See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 16 (Noting that 
“typical enabling statute[s] of a policing agency simply authorize[] it to enforce the criminal law,” but 
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To appreciate the point more concretely, consider an example of Professor 
Mendlow’s own: the unlawful selling of loose cigarettes.  A person who does so 
may be punished.29  And if police happen to catch the wayward vendor in the act, he 
may be arrested and have his contraband seized—including, if need be, by physical 
force.  In practice, however, it turns out the vendor could also be subject to greater 
intrusion.  He could be harassed and humiliated.  He could be put in a chokehold.  
He could be strangled to death. 
The Enforceability Constraint, to be clear, is not to blame for cases like Eric 
Garner’s, which plainly flout the “reasonable means” constraint that Professor 
Mendlow takes care to layer into his account.  I hardly mean to lay all manner of 
police misconduct at Professor Mendlow’s door.  The conceptual question, however, 
is why reasonableness as to the type of force permitted in the course of law 
enforcement—as opposed to the more primary question of whether any direct force 
is warranted—should be asked to do so much work.  Why shouldn’t the reality of 
how police wield power today cause us to reconsider the viability of the 
Enforceability Constraint as a first principle of criminal law? 
In the wake of Eric Garner’s murder, Stephen Carter authored an impassioned 
defense of taking criminal law quite seriously—far more than we commonly do—
given the enforcement authority it is usually taken to imply: 
 
It’s not just cigarette tax laws that can lead to the death of those the police 
seek to arrest.  It’s every law.  Libertarians argue that we have far too many 
laws, and the Garner case offers evidence that they’re right.  I often tell 
my students that there will never be a perfect technology of law 
enforcement, and therefore it is unavoidable that there will be situations 
where police err on the side of too much violence rather than too little.  
Better training won’t lead to perfection.  But fewer laws would mean fewer 
opportunities for official violence to get out of hand.30 
 
I share Professor Carter’s dismay.  And I endorse his admonition that law, and 
criminal law especially, is not a plaything to be casually bandied about.  Once again, 
however, the fundamental question is why should the existence of a criminal law—
as an expression of the state’s authority to punish a given activity—entail authority 
to control the activity as well.  That is certainly the operative assumption of criminal 
law today.  But what drives it? 
 
they “say[] little or nothing about how to do so”—a concrete manifestation of the Enforceability 
Constraint). 
29  Whether one agrees with the criminalization of selling cigarettes on policy grounds, it seems 
beyond doubt—or at any rate, I am assuming arguendo—that such criminalization violates no 
fundamental rights. 
30  Stephen L. Carter, Law Puts Us All in the Same Danger as Eric Garner, THE VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/columns/article_26a42d3a-b51b-5bb7-
9d58-a10eada5297c.html.  
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Professor Mendlow’s answer is the Enforceability Constraint.  Echoing other 
philosophers of criminal law,31 he believes authority to punish and authority to 
control travel together—that it would be, in Professor Mendlow’s phrase, “an 
anomaly” for there to exist a “crime that the state may punish but never forcibly 
disrupt on grounds of criminality alone.”32 
Putting aside that intoxication laws already exemplify this “anomaly,” the 
normative point is that designations of anomalousness—even if true—are no 
foundation for political theory.  Professor Mendlow could be right that we, in the 
“We the people” sense, are not in the habit of authorizing punishment for activities 
over which we are not also willing to authorize more direct forms of control.  This 
hardly means, however, that the same justification underwrites both.  Perhaps it is 
anomalous—and perhaps it would even be anomalous under ideal political 
conditions—for an activity to be legitimately punishable but not subject to more 
direct forms of control.  Still, the possibility matters.  Using force to directly control 
an activity (on the basis of its wrongness) is simply a different mode of exercising 
power than punishing the same activity after the fact.  To observe this difference is 
not to suggest that control is always graver, or more injurious, than punishment; the 
latter, too, can produce agony, humiliation, and death.  It often does so by design.  
The point is that control and punishment require different kinds of justifications—
and that even in settings (which may be many) where both forms of authority turn 
out to be justified simultaneously, one does not stem from the other as a matter of 
course. 
This does not mean Professor Mendlow is wrong to discern a formal 
relationship between authority to punish and authority to control.  On the contrary, 
he is right to.  But the relationship is not one of license; it is one of constraint.  For 
an activity to be susceptible, in principle, to direct control by state officials in virtue 
of its wrongness, it must at least be the sort of activity that can be legitimately 
subject to criminal punishment.  The reason is simple: it would confer officials too 
much power—a sort of power inconsistent with the ideal of self-rule—if they could 
control activities, on the basis of claimed wrongness, that could not even be 
legitimately designated as crimes.  
This is the sense, ultimately, in which authority to control on the basis of 
wrongness presupposes authority to punish.  Control in the absence of punishability 
subverts the rule of law.  A legal order that allowed direct control of activities beyond 
those legitimately subjectable to punishment would no longer be a democracy.  It 
would be a police state.  For it would give individual officials the power—in at least 
some margin of cases—to substitute their own judgments of wrongness for those 
made, however imperfectly, by the people. 
 
31  See, e.g., Malcolm Thorburn, Punishment and Public Authority, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 7–32 (Antje du Bois-Pedain, Magnus Ulväng, and Petter Asp eds., 2017) 
(arguing, via an extended analogy to parenting, that the state’s authority to punish, control, and dissuade 
are all coextensive). 
32  Mendlow, supra note 1, at 2373. 
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V. 
 
When all is said and done, Professor Mendlow has confused a necessary 
condition for a necessary and sufficient one.  Authority to control requires, but is not 
entailed by, authority to punish.  Although both, under the right conditions, can be 
justified, both also have the capacity to produce serious harms.  Yet the harms 
diverge; the threat of overzealous policing is simply different from the threat of 
overzealous prosecution and incarceration, much as they blend together in practice.  
At the level of advocacy, the two might be safely treated as monolithic.  At the level 
of political theory, however, we should insist on the distinction; and only the more 
so if lasting reform—especially around policing—is what we seek. 
